Intergenerational trauma dating back to World War II causes about 19 percent of Poles - nearly one in five - to have symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, shows recent research conducted at the University of Warsaw. This is much more than the global average (about 5-10 percent). This type of 'national trauma" affects not only individuals, but also social behaviour and political life.

'This applies to Poland, but also to Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries and western Russia, i.e. areas that, in a very short period of time, experienced a huge scale of trauma resulting from genocide, mass crimes and a very bloody occupation. All of this fundamentally changed the psyche of Poles', says Michał Bilewicz from the Center for Research on Prejudice at the University of Warsaw.

Changes in mentality and human psyche were included in the analyses of psychologists and educators who studied Polish youth immediately after the end of the war. 'After the war, young Poles were very anxious, had a strong sense of injustice or wrong that they experienced. They were very sensitive to the fact that other people could hurt them, have bad intentions towards them', the researcher describes.

According to Bilewicz, all of these experiences, passed on to subsequent generations, shaped a certain type of political culture resulting from the old strategies of 'adapting to trauma', i.e. adapting to life in extreme conditions of occupation. These old adaptation mechanisms have survived to this day and 'are a ball and chain' of Polish society.

The first phenomenon associated with the traumatisation of society is distrust, lack of trust in institutions, in the state, in the police, in the courts, in other people. This trust among Poles is at a very low level. In many comparative studies, Poland comes out very badly in this respect compared to the rest of Europe.

'This translates into political polarisation also in the sense that supporters of parties that lose elections are full of distrust towards those who win those elections. Generally, when we think about politicians, we are convinced that they do not act in our interest, that they are not guided by good intentions, that their goal is not the raison d'état but their own, particular interests', Michał Bilewicz says.

If the authorities are not trusted by public, then they also feel that they have no obligation to be guided by the public interest. Deprived of trust, politicians themselves start to behave in a way that prevents rebuilding this trust.

'This deadlock results from the fact that we have a society that has experienced a traumatic situation in which trust was very risky. After all, during the war you couldn't trust anyone. People adapted to this. The post-war years, the period of Stalinism, didn't rebuild this trust either, because we had a state imposed from the outside. Only now is this trust emerging, but political polarisation makes it difficult for us to create relationships based on trust', the researcher describes.

On the substrate of the sense of injustice, something called 'conspiracy mentality' grows. When we think about politics and social issues, we have the impression that everything is a setup, evil intentions of groups or forces that work to our disadvantage are everywhere.

Michał Bilewicz explains that this 'conspiracy mentality' occurs among people with strong political beliefs, but it is not only characteristic of right-wing views. However, it does fuel political polarisation, because if distrust of our political opponents is high, taking away their power becomes the greatest priority, even a raison d'état.

'We begin to transfer this way of thinking from politicians to the whole of society. People we disagree with politically are starting to be treated as enemies, or rather traitors. The rhetoric of national treason is very common in Poland. Law and Justice often presents the Civic Platform as a party of German interests, controlled from the outside. In turn, when the democratic coalition was in opposition, it was commonly said that Russia, the interests of the Kremlin were behind the rule of Law and Justice. The fact that we so quick to enter the framework of conspiratorial thinking, suspecting others of betrayal, is also the result of our traumatic history', Bilewicz explains.

Studies conducted, among others, by Bilewicz have also shown that people who experience transgenerational trauma symptoms the most are much more likely to accept conspiratorial explanations of the political present. In turn, studies conducted during the Smolensk air disaster, also by his team, have shown that those people whose attention was particularly focused on history and who had read a lot about Polish martyrdom were much quicker to accept that there was a conspiracy, a treason in Smolensk; that the Smolensk air disaster was an attack on the Polish president and political elites.

Conspiracy theories are intensifying and determining political behaviour, especially during the election period. 'We can see this now that we have a nearly fifty-fifty presidential election result. You can see how quickly various rigged election theories emerge. Based on the fact that mistakes were made in several electoral commissions, which of course does happen and requires thorough verification, suggestions immediately appeared that these mistakes were of an organized nature. I am surprised when I see that educated people who think rationally about politics suddenly fall into a conspiratorial mindset and mentality in the face of an election defeat', the researcher says.

He explains that in order to slowly change this attitude, it will be helpful to change the way history is taught and told. It is important not to focus only on martyrdom and tragedies, but at the same time also show the achievements of science and culture. Show history in all its diversity. Point out that even in these tragic situations, Poles also coped with adversities.

'This kind of tale of our history will increase the sense of agency, the sense of control over reality. We know that the lack of this factor pushes people most into conspiratorial thinking and polarisation. Sometimes we say that conspiracy theories are the domain of losers. And indeed, in our study of over twenty countries, published in the journal Nature Human Behaviour, we showed that electorates of the losing parties - regardless of whether they are left-wing or right-wing parties - are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. Losing an election often causes a sense of helplessness. And conspiracy theories spread when people feel helpless. Our history contributes to this, it only gives people a lesson that we are constantly at risk, that others are against us', he emphasises.

PAP - Science in Poland, Ewelina Krajczyńska-Wujec (PAP)

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