Wojciech Kotowicz from the Institute of Political Sciences at the university said the boundary between peace and war in the information sphere has effectively disappeared as disinformation becomes an integral part of broader hybrid strategies.

The conclusions come from research conducted last year by scientists from the Institute of Political Sciences examining the impact of Russian disinformation on public opinion in Eastern European countries.

Kotowicz, who led the project, said that in contemporary Russian doctrine information operations are combined with economic, military and cyber pressure to influence political processes and paralyse decision-making.

“During our study visits to Chisinau and Tbilisi, experts confirmed that information is used to destabilise sentiment before key votes. It is also used to mask real military actions or exert psychological pressure on civilians. We see that in the information sphere, the line between peacetime and wartime has practically ceased to exist,” Kotowicz said.

The researcher cited the information campaign surrounding Georgia’s controversial “foreign agents” law as an example.

“On the one hand, Russian media and pro-Russian Georgian politicians conducted an intensive information campaign presenting the law as a necessary measure to protect sovereignty against Western imperialism. They exploited real-life examples of Western interference in other countries, mixing fact with fiction to create a convincing narrative. On the other hand, the same disinformation network systematically discredited mass protests against the law, using deepfakes and fabricated evidence to portray demonstrators as paid Western agents,” he said.

At the same time, social media campaigns attempted to intimidate potential protesters by spreading false reports of arrests and repression. Russia also threatened energy restrictions and trade sanctions against Georgian products while cyber operations targeted government institutions and independent media outlets.

Kotowicz said these cyberattacks were later used in disinformation campaigns as supposed evidence of the instability and weakness of pro-European policies.

“This multifaceted, coordinated attack demonstrates how information has become an integral part of a broader hybrid strategy,” he added.

The researchers found that local political actors and influencers often played a crucial role in spreading such narratives.

“We have determined that public resistance to these actions is alarmingly low in regions with poor access to independent media. This conclusion indicates that simple fact-checking is not enough; a profound reform of media education and the strengthening of civil society are necessary,” Kotowicz said.

He added that Russian disinformation campaigns have become significantly more sophisticated in recent years.

“The days when Russian propaganda was easily recognizable due to its primitiveness and obvious bias are over. Modern disinformation campaigns utilise advanced data analytics, artificial intelligence, and a deep understanding of local cultural and social contexts,” he said.

Researchers observed that in Moldova Russian campaigns used different narratives tailored to specific ethnic and linguistic groups, while in Georgia they relied on local influencers and opinion leaders who were often unaware they were amplifying pro-Kremlin messages.

Kotowicz said the research shows that disinformation is part of a long-term strategy rather than a series of isolated campaigns.

“In both countries, we saw evidence of long-term, systematic efforts to build pro-Russian influence networks, fund local media and organizations, and support specific politicians and political parties. Disinformation is just one element of this broader strategy, which also encompasses economic, political, and social influence. This means that effective countermeasures must also be long-term, strategic, and multidimensional,” he added.

Anna Mikołajczyk-Kłębek (PAP)

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